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EDA and EU Defence Procurement 
Integration  
Aris Georgopoulos* 
1. Introduction 
The purchase and development of weapons and related materiel are activities closely 
linked with some core powers/functions of the Westphalian nation-state, namely national 
defence. Yet soon after the dawn of the new century major regulatory and policy changes 
have emerged in this area within the European Union. The process of EU integration in 
the area of defence procurement reached its (regulatory) culmination with the enactment 
of the Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EU
1
 (hereinafter the DSP 
Directive).   
The present chapter reflects upon the ten years since the establishment of the European 
Defence Agency (hereinafter EDA) and analyses the role of the latter in the process of 
European integration in the area of defence procurement. The chapter examines the 
various initiatives undertaken so far by the EDA in the process of europeanisation of a 
policy area that has been linked traditionally to core functions of the state and for that 
reason based upon a decision making process carried out primarily at national level. The 
chapter argues that the EDA’s contribution in the process of European integration in the 
field of defence procurement has been especially noteworthy. In particular the chapter 
submits that the EDA played a crucial role in two ways: Firstly it demystified and 
rendered more acceptable the deliberation at the EU level of issues pertaining to the 
design, rules and policies of defence procurement/market. Secondly by doing so it 
provided additional political “legitimisation” to the process of integration of European 
defence procurement/market integration which led to the enactment of the DSP Directive.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Part 2 provides the necessary clarifications regarding 
the definitions of key concepts. Part 3 places the EDA in its historical and political 
context and suggests that the EDA should not be seen only as an institutional offspring of 
political developments in the area of high politics such as the emergence of ESDP but 
also an institutional product that incorporates lessons learned from previous –
unsuccessful- efforts of coordination/integration in the area of defence 
procurement/markets in Europe (but outside the EU). Part 4 examines the EDA initiatives 
undertaken in the area of defence procurement. Part 5 discusses their impact on the 
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process of integration in this area. Part 6 synopsises the argument and presents some 
concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Preliminary Conceptual and Terminological clarifications 
Before embarking on the examination of the role of the EDA in the process of European 
defence procurement/market integration it is necessary to clarify some of the terms used 
and the relevant signified concepts.  
To begin with the term defence procurement is used narrowly. In other words it refers to 
the acquisition of goods and services that have been manufactured, used or intended to be 
used for purely military purposes (Georgopoulos 2004, 21-28), (SIGMA/OECD, 2011, 
2).
2
 In other words this definition uses a functional criterion that looks at whether the 
procurement activity –and the relevant goods or services- are connected with the core of 
what is generally understood as national defence and national security. Furthermore 
defence procurement in this sense is often –but not always- characterised by the 
complexity of the relevant technologies.
3
According to this definition of defence 
procurement the size of the relevant market in the EU was approximately € 84 billion in 
2012 (EDA 2013, 12) 
Furthermore the term/phrase European defence procurement integration
4
 needs to be 
delimited. European integration is understood in this context as the process of 
progressive Europeanisation
5
 –under the auspices of the EU- of the relevant policy area 
and the gradual opening up of national defence markets to intra-Union competition. In 
particular integration is viewed widely and includes looser forms of coordination of 
national policies without the imposition of a binding EU framework or agenda. 
In addition the concept of integration can be further analysed/subdivided into three 
dimensions: an economic, a legal/regulatory and a political dimension. The present 
chapter focuses on the examination of the EDA’s role particularly on the legal and 
political dimension of European integration in the field of defence procurement. 
                                                          
2
 According to this narrow definition the notion of defence procurement covers for example the acquisition of 
fighter jets, frigates, munitions, missiles and associated services. This is to be contrasted with a wider definition 
of defence procurement that covers all acquisitions of goods and services by contracting authorities in the 
defence sector (including for example the procurement of food supplies, stationary, clothes etc.) 
3
 The issue of whether the procurement of “dual-use” technologies  are covered by this definition is beyond the 
remit of this chapter. It suffices to note that the issue has lost some of its practical significance because the field 
of application of the DSP Directive covers sensitive procurement activities not only related to defence but also 
to security. Having said that the issue is still relevant with regard to the scope of application of Article 396 
TFEU and of the other provisions of the Treaty introducing security related exemptions from the free movement 
rules (for example Article 36 TFEU).  
4
 Alternative versions of the phrase may appear in the text (for example defence procurement/market integration 
in the EU). They are meant to have the same meaning.  
5
 Europeanisation in this context does not mean the replacement of the national by the European. This would be 
the case if European political integration reached a point where instead of national armed forces there were one 
European army whose needs would be catered for at EU level. Clearly at the moment this seems a highly 
uncertain possibility. Instead Europeanisation here involves the inclusion of a European layer in a policy area 
that customarily has been deliberated, formed and carried out at national level.   
 3. Historical and Political Context  
In order to examine the role that the EDA has played in the process of European 
integration in defence procurement it is important to remind ourselves briefly the 
historical and political context in which EDA was created and the environment in which it 
later operated. 
Firstly it is worth remembering that the EDA’s creation in 2004 was a “last minute” 
deviation from the original plan. According to this plan the creation of the EDA was part 
of the changes that were to be introduced by the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe.
6
 Instead the Thessaloniki European Council
7
 decided to dissociate in effect the 
creation of the EDA from the uncertain, at that time, future of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. The European Council tasked the competent bodies of the EU to 
create within the course of 2004 the EDA; the latter was subsequently established by 
Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP.
8
 Two questions arise in this regard: Firstly, why 
establish the EDA? Secondly, why the deviation from the original plan? 
With regard to the first question the following have been considered as the main reasons 
for creating the EDA (Georgopoulos, 2005b, 109) namely the need for improving 
European defence capabilities, the need for streamlining of the institutional framework in 
European armaments cooperation whilst learning the lessons from previous experiences. 
Let us now look at each point more closely. 
Firstly ever since the Anglo-French St Malo declaration in 1998 the EU has raised 
expectations
9
 that it would increase its role in the field of defence and security but had 
failed time and again to match the rhetoric with tangible actions. Particularly in the area 
of defence capabilities an alarming gap had been demonstrated between US and European 
armed forces during the intervention in Kosovo. Consequently concerted action in order 
to improve defence capabilities in the era of reduced defence budgets was seen by the 
majority of MSs as a necessity.  
Secondly although, efforts for coordinating armaments policies in Europe have been 
already made outside the legal and institutional framework of the EU
10
 they had up until 
that point mixed results in terms of achieving their stated aims. Furthermore and perhaps 
more importantly they had created a complex institutional landscape that was 
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 For example the establishment of the ESDP and the subsequent creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force. 
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 Initially under the auspices of the Western European Union (hereinafter WEU) in the form of the Western 
European Armaments Group (hereinafter WEAG) and the Western European Armaments Organisation 
(hereinafter WEAO) and later on a plurilateral basis amongst some EU MSs under the Joint Armaments Co-
operation Organisation (hereinafter OCCAR) and the Letter of Intent Initiative (hereinafter LoI) 
characterised by a degree of duplication (in terms of aims and resources). The creation of 
the EDA would assist the streamlining of the institutional landscape in the area of 
armaments and would bring it by and enlarge under the auspices of the EU.
11
  
Thirdly all of these initiatives seemed to have missed the elusive balance between 
inclusiveness on the one hand and flexibility on the other. For example both the WEAG 
and WEAO were in principle inclusive
12
 (Georgopoulos, 2007a, 208) but as a result they 
were cumbersome in moving ahead with the process of European cooperation in 
armaments. On the other hand OCCAR which was created initially by the four largest 
armaments producing MSs
13
 seemed to introduce more flexibility but at the expense of 
inclusiveness by bluntly excluding MSs with medium and small sized defence industrial 
bases (Mawdsley, 2003, 18), (Georgopoulos 2007a, 210). The creation of the EDA 
incorporated the lessons learned from these initiatives. This is demonstrated in particular 
by the incorporation of two different categories of ad hoc collaborative 
projects/programmes namely Category A and Category B. The first draws from lessons 
from the WEAG and in particular of the EUROPA MoU
14
 and second from OCCAR. 
(Georgopoulos, 2005b, 111), (Schmitt, 2003a, 94). 
After addressing the question “why the EDA” we now turn on the question regarding the 
deviation from the original plan (i.e. as part of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe). It has been argued
15
 that two were the main reasons. 
Firstly the Iraq war –which started in March 2003- had created an unpleasant rift amongst 
the governments of EU15 with the immediate consequence of the EU, once again, not 
being able to frame a united, coherent voice in the area of CFSP. Finding a CFSP related 
theme or project that would attract the support of the large majority of MSs was deemed a 
priority. One such theme was identified in the “lower regions”16 of the “high politics” of 
CFSP and was none other than the issue of European defence capabilities and armament 
cooperation. 
Secondly it should be remembered that in March 2003 the European Commission had 
reopened the debate about the role of the EU in the area of defence markets with the 
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politics because armaments cooperation in addition to political aspects have strong technical/practical and 
economic ones they can be placed at  the lower echelons of “high politics”.   
publication of COM (2003).
17
 This document demonstrated the Commission’s clear aim 
which was the attempt to introduce supranational elements in the area thus strengthening 
its role. As it had been suggested at the time it was clear that “more Europe” in the area of 
defence market was necessary –for the reasons explained above- but what was uncertain 
was where this process of integration would take place –namely under the Community 
pillar or under the CFSP or in an inter pillar straddled arrangement-  and also what 
intensity this process of integration would have –particularly with regard to the role and 
involvement of the Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter CJEU) and 
the European Parliament (Georgopoulos, 2005a, 560). In other words the decision of the 
Member States to dissociate the establishment of the EDA from the uncertain and in any 
case lengthy ratification process of the Treaty should be seen in a context where all the 
major European institutional stakeholders were trying secure their role in the European 
defence market integration process and affect the direction of the latter. Thus the speedy 
establishment of EDA was intended to strengthen the “intergovernmental” pole in the 
debate that was about to begin about armaments cooperation and regulation in Europe.   
 
4. European Defence Procurement Integration and EDA 
It is suggested that EDA’s role in the process of European defence procurement 
integration has been important. As it will be shown below under section 5 this is true for 
both the legal/regulatory and the political dimension of the integration process. In order to 
demonstrate this observation this part of the chapter will examine some of the initiatives 
undertaken so far by the EDA that are connected with the area of defence procurement. 
The exhaustive presentation and analysis of each of the initiatives lie beyond the remit of 
this chapter. Instead the aim of the analysis is to highlight their combined effect on the 
process of European defence procurement integration up to now. The relevant initiatives 
are the Code of Conduct for defence procurement (CoC), the Code of Best Practice in the 
Supply Chain (CoBPSC), the Code of Conduct on offsets (CoCO), the initiatives for 
Security of Information (SoI), the initiatives in connection to Security of Supply (SoS) 
and the Effective Procurement Methods initiative (EPM).  
 
4.1 Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement 
EDA’s first important initiative in the area of defence procurement was the CoC. The 
latter was launched 1 July 2006 and had as its main aim the introduction of openness, 
transparency and competition in the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM).  
As with all EDA defence procurement related initiatives the CoC has the following 
characteristics: it is voluntary, non-legally binding or enforceable and intergovernmental.  
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The voluntary character meant that EDA participating MSs were not obliged to join the 
CoC. Furthermore EDA MSs that decided to join the CoC are free to withdraw from the 
regime at any given point. For example Spain and Hungary decided not to join 
immediately –they did so eventually in 2007- (Georgopoulos, 2008, NA8), Romania 
decided not to join at all and the UK has considered leaving it in the context of the wider 
reassessment of her participation in the EDA as a whole.
18
 This is linked also with the 
intergovernmental nature of the CoC. The non-legally binding nature of the CoC meant of 
course that the success of the initiative depended entirely on the willingness and political 
will of the subscribing MSs. It should be remembered that the CoC is very similar to the 
“Coherent Policy Document” (CPD), adopted in 1990, which set the principles for the 
creation of a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) under the auspices of 
WEAG –which had failed precisely because of the MSs’ lack of political will 
(Georgopoulos, 2006a, 51-52, 57-58). 
The CoC covers defence procurement contracts that meet the criteria of Article 346 
TFEU,
19
 (former Article 296 EC) and whose value exceeds € 1 million. The CoC contains 
also some exemptions.
20
 One of these is collaborative programmes. Clearly the exclusion 
of collaborative procurement from the CoC’s coverage means that the regime is aimed 
primarily at off-the-shelf procurement contracts. From this it follows that there is a 
significant overlap between the CoC’s field of application and that of the DSP Directive.  
This observation means that the two regimes at least from a legal point of view are 
antagonistic. Why? Because logically they cannot apply both at the same time 
Georgopoulos, 2007b, 47). One has to give way to other particularly because the (CoC) is 
self-regulatory, non-legally binding (CFSP pillar) instrument whereas the DSP Directive 
is a legally binding and enforceable (first pillar, internal market) instrument. It is 
important to note that although the CoC was viewed by some commentators as a potential 
danger to the acquis communautaire (Trybus, 2006, 690) the Commission formally 
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 Article 346 reads: 
1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules:(a) no Member 
State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential 
interests of its security;  
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential 
interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; 
such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products 
which are not intended for specifically military purposes. 
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes to the list, 
which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply. 
20
 The CoC excluded from its field of application the following types of defence procurerement contracts: i) 
Research and Development contracts; ii) collaborative procurements; iii) contracts of chemical, bacteriological 
and radiological goods and services; iv) nuclear weapons; v) nuclear propulsion systems; vi) cryptographic 
equipment. 
characterised the CoC as complementary instrument to the DSP Directive
21
 since, 
according to the Commission, they covered different segments of the defence market. It 
suffices to note
22
 that the non-complementarity –from a legal point of view- between the 
two regimes is further evidenced by the fact that the EDA tries to adapt the CoC to the 
post DSP directive environment.
23
  
It is argued that the most significant practical contribution of the CoC initiative was the 
creation of the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) portal. This was a central portal where 
subscribing MSs would announce contract opportunities following a particular format. 
The centralisation of the publication of these contract opportunities in one portal meant 
that it would be easier for potential contractors to identify them.
24
 Various kinds of 
notices were publishable at the EBB (Heuninckx, 2009, 47): a) Prior information notices 
namely notices that provide in advance general information about future needs of a 
contracting entity, b) Contract notices inviting the submission of tenders or the 
submission of requests for participation by interested contractors c) Contract bidder 
notices containing the list of contractors that have been selected to participate in a 
particular procurement process, d) Contract notices identifying the successful contractor 
who has been awarded the contract and e) Request for Information, namely notices 
through which contracting authorities invite the industry to send information –for 
example the type of available solutions in the market- about a future procurement contract 
without necessarily launching a procurement process.      
The variety of these notices means that the CoC apart from a vehicle to improve openness 
of the national defence markets it has been a useful tool for data collection about these 
markets and the conduct of the relevant national authorities.  
The CoC and the EBB have been used more than other similar previous initiatives and in 
this sense it should be judged as more successful. However as it will be mentioned further 
below under section 5 the impact of the CoC on the defence procurement integration 
process is not based only on the frequency of its use by the subscribing MSs. I t should be 
noted that the EBB portal stopped being operational in its original form in June 2013.
25
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 Instead of having to monitor various national ones as the case was under the WEAG EDEM regime. 
25
 Although the EDA website refer to the creation of a new gateway with information on EDA as the reason it is 
highly likely that this development is also linked with the entry into force of the DSP Directive which requires 
the publicationof defence procurement contract on the of Official Journal of the EU and as a result Tender 
Electronic Daily (TED) is the appropriate online platform.  
4.2 Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain 
The CoBPSC was agreed in 2006 before the entry into force of the CoC. The elaboration 
of the CoBPSC had been announced in the document that established the CoC. Therefore 
the two codes were conceptually linked with each other from the very beginning forming 
integral parts of the EDA’s intergovernmental regime on defence procurement. More 
specifically, as it has been shown, the CoC aimed at introducing competition at the level 
of prime contractors whereas the aim of the CoBPSC was to introduce greater 
transparency and competition in the lower tiers of the defence market, namely at the level 
of subcontractors and by doing so increase the efficiency, quality, timeliness and 
consistency in the supply chain.    
This means that the CoBPSC is not addressed to contracting authorities (public actors) 
but to the prime contractors (private actors) that are awarded the defence procurement 
contract. In other words the instrument aims at affecting the behaviour of enterprises.  
It should be remembered at this point that in principle enterprises as market participants 
are subject to market forces. For this reason according to economic theory these actors –
in our case prime contractors- would take rational decisions in the selection process of 
their subcontractors aimed at increasing efficiency, lowering costs, improving quality etc. 
So what was the need for an instrument that tried to affect the behaviour of enterprises 
towards a direction that they were prone to follow anyway?   
The answer of course is the particularities of defence market(s). As opposed to the 
conditions of perfect competition upon which economic theory is based the reality in the 
defence procurement market is different. As we have seen these markets are characterised 
by fragmentation often upon national protectionist lines and are by definition 
monosponistic (i.e dominated by one buyer) or at the very least oligopsnonistic (i.e 
characterised by a small number of buyers). This type of imperfect competition in the 
market allows for the preferences of the buyer to be fed in the supply chain of the seller. 
If these preferences -as the case of the European fragmented national defence markets is- 
are informed by protectionist intentions then protectionism will probably contaminate the 
rest of the supply chain. For this reason it was agreed that the EDA’s intergovernmental 
regime on defence procurement should address this aspect too. 
The CoBPSC shares the same characteristics of the CoC; in other words it is an 
intergovernmental, non-legally binding and non-legally enforceable instrument. 
The latter was also implemented through an Electronic Bulletin Board platform (EBB2). 
It should be notied that the EBB2 could be used by prime contractors to advertise 
subcontract opportunities not only in relation to defence contracts that meet the conditions 
of article 346 TFEU –i.e. contracts that are covered by the CoC- but also for defence 
related subcontracts more generally. It has been argued that the CoBPSC was one of the 
“carrots” to incentivise compliance (particularly on the part of participating MSs with 
medium and small defence industrial bases) in the context of a system with virtually no 
“sticks” (Georgopoulos, 2006b NA147).  
Like the rest of the intergovernmental regime on defence procurement the CoBPSC is 
under review in the aftermath of the DSP Directive.  
Despite the stated objective of the CoBPSC about “…influencing behaviour in the supply 
chain to encourage fair competition at the national level and across the [subscribing MSs] 
”26 the latter did not deal with the issue of offsets and related practices even though it is 
through these types of practices that protectionist (or to use a more neutral term domestic 
industrial) preferences are fed from the demand side (public sector) to the prime 
contractor level (private sector) and then diffused into their supply chain arguably 
distorting competition. In fact the term offsets is not mentioned in the CoBPSC at all. 
Instead offsets were the subject of another EDA code of conduct discussed immediately 
below. 
 
4.3 The Code of Conduct on Offsets 
As already mentioned one of the areas of the European defence procurement market that 
all the regulatory initiatives at EU level had refrained from addressing directly up until 
the relevant EDA initiatives was the treatment of offset practices (known also as offsets or 
industrial compensations). The first time
27
 that an EU regulatory initiative included 
offsets as its main focus was the EDA CoCO.   
Before examining the CoCO it is important to explain what offset practices are. 
Offsets are practices followed in the context of defence procurement whereby procuring 
States try to safeguard a return of their “investment” –i.e. the payment given to a foreign 
defence contractor for the acquisition of defence equipment or related services- for their 
domestic industry (Georgopoulos, 2011, 30). Offset policies can be implemented in a 
variety of ways and offsets may manifest themselves in various forms. Although there is 
not a standardized nomenclature or categorization of offset practices as such, it is argued 
that offsets can be categorised as follows
28
 (Georgopoulos, 2011, 33): 
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 The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, para. 5 
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 Previously the European Commission had simply stated its general disagreement with offset practices (see for 
example COM (2006) 779 final, Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty 
in the field of Defence Procurement, Brussels. For an analysis of the Communication see Georgopoulos, 2007b. 
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28
 See Georgopoulos, 2004, 344 and also Final Report Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a 
European Defence Industry and Market, 2007, 3. 
 
- Direct offsets: Offset transactions that are directly related to the defence items or 
services imported by a participating Member State. For example under this category 
offset practices can take the form co-production, subcontracting, training, licensed 
production, technology transfer. The distinguishing factor and principal point of 
reference for these offset practices is the subject of the main defence procurement 
contract (namely they take place in the context of the delivery of the defence contract 
that forms the subject of the main transaction between the procuring government and 
the foreign contractor). 
- Indirect offsets: Offset transactions that are not directly related to the defence items or 
services imported by a procuring government. In turn Indirect offsets are subdivided 
into:  
o Defence related indirect offsets. The latter are not linked with the delivery of 
the contract that forms the subject matter of the main transaction between the 
procuring government and the foreign contractor but still are to be 
implemented in the field of defence. For example the main contract regards 
the acquisition of 40 new aircraft by state A but the offset contract regards the 
purchase by the defence contractor of the main contract (the winner of the 
competition) of defence related services (for example maintenance services) 
from companies established in State A. However these services are not related 
with the purchase of the 40 new aircraft by State A. Instead they can be used 
by the defence contractor in other future contracts with this or other countries. 
o  Non-defence related indirect offsets (also known as “civil” offsets). This kind 
of indirect offsets are not linked with the subject matter of the main defence 
procurement contract and they are implemented outside of the field of defence. 
For example the main contract regards the acquisition of 40 new aircraft by 
state A but the offset contract concerns the purchase by the foreign defence 
contractor of fax machines produced from companies established in State A. 
In this case the indirect offset contract has nothing to do with the field of 
defence. 
As already implied the aforementioned categorisation is meant to function as schematic 
representation of what in reality is a more complex typological environment. It may be 
difficult in practice to place some offset contracts (only or strictly) under one of these 
categories. This is because modern defence systems contain technologies that are used in both 
the defence and civil sectors. These technological crossovers mean essentially that the 
distinction between defence and civil technologies is less clear-cut than it used to be. As a 
result although the distinction between direct and indirect offsets seems in principle to be a 
little bit more straightforward,
29
 for an increasing number of indirect offset contracts the 
classification under the defence indirect and non-defence indirect offset categories may be a 
challenging moot point. 
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 Even though due to the hybrid character of modern technology, logically direct offsets may also include 
technologies that are not purely defence in nature (for example dual use technologies). 
The discussion –let alone treatment- of offset practices generates mixed views and strong 
emotions. On the one hand offsets are seen as practices that distort competition in the 
market.
30
 On the other hand they are viewed as an important tool for the development of 
domestic defence industrial and technological capabilities, particularly for developing 
countries. In the context of the EU offsets also raise questions about their compatibility with 
EU Law. The legal treatment of offsets in the EU has always been controversial. This is why 
the contribution of the EDA in discussing offsets more openly and -as we will see further 
below- providing a preliminary roadmap for their treatment within the EU must be 
considered as significant.  
It is worth mentioning that before the elaboration of the CoCO the EDA had commissioned 
an independent study that examined the impact of offset practices on the development of a 
European defence market. Although the study did not provide conclusive answers regarding 
the overall impact of offset practices on the development of the European defence industry 
and market it made clear on the one hand that as a matter of principle these practices are not a 
priori compatible with EU law but from a practical point of view –if used properly- they may 
prove useful tools for industrial development. Furthermore the study acknowledged that 
offsets are not only a European phenomenon and that they are frequently used around the 
world.  
The CoCO came into force on 1 July 2009.
31
 The stated aim of the CoCO was the 
improvement of the competitive conditions in the European Defence Equipment Market 
(EDEM) and also the promotion of a competitive European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDITB).
32
 
Although a detailed analysis of the CoCO is beyond the scope of the present chapter
33
 it 
suffices to note the following points. 
Firstly the CoCO put forward a proposition for dealing with offsets that was based on a 
constructive and pragmatic approach. This approach recognised that although offsets can 
create market distortions in the context of perfect competition conditions they can also work 
as mechanisms that assist the creation a level playing field in a market characterised by 
imperfect competition conditions; particularly if the relevant market is influenced by political 
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 They also raise concerns regarding their lack of transparency and for this reason are seen as a factor that can 
assist the breeding of corruption in the field of defence. The lack of (or limited) transparency of course is not 
only a characteristic of offset arrangements but it has characterised defence procurement more generally. A 
detailed discussion of corruption in the defence sector lies beyond the remit of this chapter. For an analysis of 
corruption in the context of offsets see Transparency International’s report Defence Offsets: Addressing the risks 
of Corruption and Raising Transparency, 2010, available online at: 
http://archive.transparency.org/publications/publications/other/defence_offsets    
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 See A Code of Conduct on Offsets Agreed by the EU Member States Participating in the European defence 
Agency (version approved on May 3 2011) available on line at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/The_Code_of_Conduct_on_Offsets.pdf   
32
 In accordance with the Strategy that was agreed by the EU Defence Ministers. See “Strategy for European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base”, Brussels, May 14, 2007, 5, available online at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/strategy_for_the_european_defence_technological_and_industrial_b
ase.pdf  
33
 For a detailed analysis of the CoCO see Georgopoulos, 2011.  
considerations like the defence procurement market.
34
 By recognising this reality explicitly 
the CoCO adopted a more useful stance –as opposed to the doctrinal stance of principle 
against offsets often articulated by the Commission- - that furthered the debate regarding the 
treatment of offsets. In other words the EDA through the CoCO, instead of the demonization 
of offsets considered the possibility of using of this mechanism in a way that supports the 
EDITB – principle of instrumentality- while attempting to minimise its adverse effects on the 
development of a fair and competitive EDEM –principle of restraint  Georgopoulos, 2011, 
35). The EDA in-house study on abatements
35
 was a tangible demonstration of this 
constructive and pragmatic approach.   
Secondly by adopting the aforementioned stance the EDA manage to convince participating 
MSs to materialize in practice the two main principles enshrined in the CoCO namely 
transparency and mutual trust. The EDA via the CoCO managed to shed light on a sensitive 
area often characterised by secrecy. It managed in particular to convince participating MSs to 
reveal/share information about their national offset policies. In this way MSs became both 
providers and recipients of the relevant information. 
The EDA managed to create -to a degree at least- an environment of mutual trust for 
information sharing and as a result participating MSs did reveal in the relevant portal –for the 
time that the portal was still operational- substantial information
36
 regarding their national 
offset policies. It is worth mentioning that like other EDA online portals the offset portal was 
accessible not only to participating MSs but also to the general public.  
Like the other pre DSP Directive initiatives of the EDA, the CoCO has been under review in 
the aftermath of the enactment and transposition in the national legal orders of the new 
directive.
37
 MSs are considering whether to continue or alter their offset policies.
38
  
  
4.4 Security of Information 
Another aspect of defence procurement where the EDA has played a constructive role is SoI. 
The latter is important in the context of defence procurement and can function as a trade 
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 CoCO, 2 
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 Abatements: A Pragmatic Tool to Facilitate the Development of European Defence Equipment Market, EDA, 
2010, Brussels, available online at: 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/Abstract_-_Study_on_Abatements For a presentation and  analysis 
of the study on abatements see Georgopoulos, 2011, 37-39. 
36
 For more on the specific type of information that MSs agreed to share on the portal see Georgopoulos, 2011, 
37.  
37
 Although the DSP Directive does not deal with offset practices directly the Commission, has issued a 
Guidance Note of offsets where it explicate its strict stance vis-à-vis offsets. Although the Guidance note is not 
legally binding it nevertheless affects de fact the decision of MSs whether and how to implement offset policies. 
The Guidance note is available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/guide-offsets_en.pdf  
38
 Perhaps this process of reviewing explains the fact he EDA portal where information about national offset 
policies is no longer accessible. It was accessible at least until 6 January 2014, see Heuninckx, 2014, 47.  
barrier if standards and processes followed by the various MSs differ significantly.
39
 This is 
also linked with the observation made earlier regarding the overarching aim of EDA’s 
initiatives in the field of defence namely the building of trust amongst the participating MSs. 
Already from 2006 the EDA contributed to the process for improving the environment 
regarding SoI by agreeing on common minimum standards for ensuring industrial security.
40
 
Furthermore the EDA established recently an electronic portal
41
 where the various national 
legislations, policies that are linked with SoI can be found.
42
 This is particularly important in 
the post DSP Directive regulatory environment. It should be remembered that dealing with 
SoI is one of the priority areas of the new regime.  
 
The EDA has been mandated by MSs to identify ways to remove SoI barriers in defence 
procurement amongst MSs. Through the exchange of information on national SoI standards 
and policies the SoI portal constitutes the first step in this process.  
   
4.5 Security of Supply 
Another practical yet crucial aspect of the defence procurement market where the EDA has 
being playing a notable role is SoS. The latter covers cases such as the long term support of 
military equipment during their life cycle, the ability to supply forces deployed abroad and to 
deal with unplanned increases of operational requirement due to unforeseeable events 
(Heuninckx, 2014, 34). Often SoS considerations have been used for justifying national offset 
policies and other protectionist measures.  
It should be noted that although the DSP Directive includes provisions on SoS
43
 that deal 
with some legal issues for example whether SoS considerations may be taken into account as 
award criteria it does not provide for a specific plan for dealing with the practical issues 
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 For example as mentioned in the SoI portal (see below fn 41) if there is no bilateral or multilateral agreement 
or arrangement between Member States, the relevant national contracting authorities can refuse to recognize the 
security clearance from non-domestic firms. In the context of the internal market this could be considered as a 
market access barrier that underlines the creation of a competitive EDEM. 
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 See EDA Steering Board Decision No. 2006/18 on “Security of Information between Subscribing Member 
States (sMS),” which set certain “Common Minimum Standards on Industrial Security” available online at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/common-minimum-standards-on-industrial-security-.pdf  
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The EDA SoI portal was launched on 1 July 2014 and is available online at:  
http://eda.europa.eu/soiportal/default.aspx  
42
 The portal contains the following information for every participating MS: the applicable legal basis; the 
objectives of the national SoI policy; the minimum duration of the initial granting of Personnel Security  
Clearances (PSC)  and Facility Security Clearances (FSC)  and the duration for which they are valid; the 
existing bilateral/multilateral SoI agreements; the national policies and practices on sharing classified 
information; the recognition of the PSCs and FSCs; the contractual terms on SoI defence related contracts; 
relevant national authorities; relevant national SoI documents;  the National SoI Point of Contact. 
43
 Artricle 23 DSP Directive.  
linked with SoS.
44
 In order to understand some of these let us consider the following 
examples:  
- MS A and MS B have a surge in the demand for a specific type of munition at the 
same time. The relevant needs of both MSs are catered for by an economic operator 
established in MS A. This economic operator cannot satisfy both (unscheduled) 
demands simultaneously. Clearly MS A can take measures –for reasons of public 
interest, national security etc- to oblige the economic operator established in her 
jurisdiction to prioritise the needs of MS A (explicitly or implicitly over those of MS 
B).  
 
- MS A who disagrees with specific foreign policy decisions and actions of MS B 
decides to block or procrastinate the delivery of munitions by economic operator A 
established in her jurisdiction to MS B.  
The aforementioned examples try to highlight some of the practical challenges with regard to 
SoS. The EDA initiatives in the context of SoS try to fill precisely this gap between the legal 
treatment of SoS in the defence procurement process and the practical issues that arise in this 
area.  
In particular the EDA elaborated in 2006 a Framework Agreement for SoS which focused in 
cases of operational urgency
45
 initially. Following the enactment of the DSP Directive the 
scope of the Framework Agreement was expanded
46
 in order to cover also cases of defence 
acquisitions in peacetime where there is no operational urgency. This enhanced Framework 
Agreement is supported by the Code of Conduct on Prioritisation (CoCP)
47
 which is an 
instrument that aims to involve the industry in the SoS framework, by establishing a way for 
the industry to demonstrate its commitment to meet Member States SoS requirements in 
defence procurement.
48
  
These instruments are supported by an online portal
49
 which aims to enhance transparency 
and provide useful information about national legislations, policies linked with SoS.
50
 Like 
with the initiatives on offsets and SoI, the SoS initiative aims to enhance mutual trust 
amongst Member States.  
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 This is also the case for the Commission’s Guidance Note on SoS. The latter is available online at: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/guide-sos_en.pdf 
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 EDA Steering Board decision 2006/17 on a Framework Agreement for Security of Supply between 
Subscribing Member States(sMS) in Circumstances of Operational Urgency available online at: 
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 See enhanced framework Agreement on SoS available online at http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-
source/projects/framework-arrangement-for-security-of-supply.pdf  
47
 The CoCP was established on 15 May 2014 and is available online at: http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-
source/documents/code-of-conduct-on-prioritisation.pdf?Status=Temp  
48
 CoCP, 1.  
49
 The SoS portal was launched in 2011 and is available online athttp://eda.europa.eu/SOSWeb/  
50
 For example the relevant national legal bases for SoS; SoS objectives; relevant national bodies and areas of 
responsibilities; the role of SoS requirements in procurement processes; contractual terms used on SoS; existing 
bi- and multilateral agreements on SoS. 
 4.6 Effective Procurement Methods 
The last EDA defence procurement related initiative that we consider in this chapter is the 
EPM.
51
  
The EPM is the implementation of a specific task set for the EDA by the Treaty of the EU, 
namely the promotion of harmonisation of MSs’ operational requirements and the adoption of 
compatible effective procurement methods.
52
 The EPM is linked with and is intended to 
complement the wider Pooling and Sharing initiative
53
 of the EDA.  
In particular the EPM initiative aims to identify ways, methods and areas where MSs (or 
some of them) may consolidate their demand in the context of off-the-shelf procurement thus 
achieving economies of scale, reducing duplication and improving interoperability. Areas 
with such potential for demand consolidation are amongst others transport or logistic support, 
training, standard vehicles, ammunition, legacy weapon systems and communication 
equipment.
54
 
After the identification of areas for demand consolidation the EPM initiative could use any of 
the main options for joint procurement for example acquisition through a lead nation that 
procures on behalf of other MSs, the option for procuring through an international body or 
organisation such as NAMSA or OCCAR and the option for the EDA to act as a central 
purchasing body on behalf of MSs. This possibility is envisaged by the DSP Directive
55
 and 
is also supported by the EDA’s legal framework.56  
The third option means that the EDA could become an one-stop-shop where the 
identification, shaping of common demand and actual procurement could take place. So far 
two pilot EPM case studies have been implemented.
57
 
 
5. Contemplating EDA’s Impact on Defence Procurement Integration   
After the discussion of the various EDA initiatives in the field of defence procurement this 
part of the chapter tries to elucidate their impact on the legal/regulatory and political 
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 The EPM initiative was launched on 7 July 2011. 
52
 Article 45 (1) (b) TEU. 
53
 The Pooling and Sharing (P&S) is focuses primarily on MS led projects to increase collaboration in military 
capabilities. Because the P&S scope is wide we cover in this chapter only aspects of the initiative that are 
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 EDA EPM Fact Sheet, June, 2012 available online at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/factsheet-
epm.pdf   
55
 Recital 23. 
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 Particularly after Council Decision 2011/411/CFSP (OJ L 183/16 ) which reinforced EDA’s legal framework 
by taking into account the changes introduced by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
57
 The first is the Counter-IED Training European Guardian (beneficiaries Luxembourg and Austria); the second 
is the Basic Logistics Services for the EU Battle Group (beneficiaries Austria, Czech Republic and Germany).  
dimensions of European defence procurement integration process. Although these two 
dimensions are interconnected an attempt to envisage theimpact of EDA’s initiatives on 
either of them separately is considered useful in order to better appreciate EDA’s overall 
contribution in the integration process.   
5.1 Impact on Legal/Regulatory Dimension of Defence Procurement Integration 
From the point of view of the legal/regulatory aspect of integration a quick glance at the state 
of play of European regulation in defence procurement may lead to the precipitate conclusion 
that the impact of EDA’s initiatives has been limited. This is because the model of regulation 
that these initiatives put forward, namely what could be termed as coordinated 
intergovernmental self-regulation did not prevail in the end. Instead it was the Community 
method model proposed by the Commission initiatives that provided the main framework 
(DSP Directive) and the forum of regulation (first pillar, internal market) in this area. 
However we argue that this impression would be utterly misguided. To explain this we 
distinguish three main ways in which the initiatives of the EDA contributed crucially to the 
legal/ regulatory integration in defence procurement. 
Firstly the EDA initiatives provided important information about the state of play of defence 
procurement markets in the EU. This information was later used by the Commission to 
strengthen the case for the adoption of a tailor made instrument of the first pillar in order to 
facilitate the functioning of the internal market in defence procurement.  
In particular the contribution of the CoC cannot be underestimated. The information available 
on the EBB portal showed clearly that despite their earlier pronouncements MS left 
significant part of their defence procurement contract opportunities outside the CoC’s more 
transparent and more competitive framework. Not only that but also many of the contract 
opportunities published on the EBB portal concerned goods and services that were not in the 
list of 1958,
58
 which, according to Article 346 (2) TFEU constitutes the point of reference 
with regard to the material scope for the application of Article 346 (1) (b) TFEU.
59
 Instead 
these contracts –for example military boots- should have been procured according to the 
public sector procurement directive.
60
 In other words in some cases MS not only were they 
not opening their defence procurement markets but in fact they were circumventing their 
obligations under the public sector procurement directive. This demonstrated vividly the level 
of misunderstanding amongst some MS of the limits of Article 346 TFEU exemption.  
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 The list is available online here:   
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014538%202008%20REV%204  
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 As explained earlier under section 4.1 a prerequisite for the application of the CoC is the fulfilment of the 
conditions of Article 346 TFEU.  
60
 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts 
[2004] OJ L134/114 
Furthermore even in the case of contracts that fulfilled the conditions of Article 346 TFEU 
the use of the CoC revealed a paradox that in effect strengthened the argument of the 
Commission for the adoption of a tailor made directive in the internal market. The paradox is 
the following: If MSs are willing to share publically through the EBB portal information 
about sensitive defence procurement opportunities then why not do this through the OJ 
following the usual rules for public sector procurement? MSs could only justify their not 
using the EU procurement rules by arguing that the public sector directive obliged 
contracting authorities to use by default the open or restricted procedures.
61
 These procedures 
leave very little margin for discretion to contracting authorities. It is precisely this point that 
the Commission addressed in its proposal for the DSP Directive in order to alleviate the 
concerns –and eliminate excuses- of MSs by introducing the negotiated procedure with prior 
publication, which allows for both flexibility and discretion,  as a standard procedure.
62
  
These observations show that without the EDA initiatives the collection of information and 
evidence –sometimes “incriminating” evidence- by the Commission relevant for building the 
case for a DSP Directive, would have been more difficult. 
Secondly the EDA initiatives had a clear impact on the content and direction of the DSP 
Directive and the other Commission initiatives. For example the material scope of DSP 
directive has been clearly influenced by the MSs preferences included in the EDA initiatives. 
In particular the exemption of collaborative procurement based on research and 
development
63
 echoes the same exemption found in the CoC. Furthermore the provisions on 
subcontracting
64
 are heavily influenced by the CoBPSC and the CoCO. Likewise the renewed 
emphasis on SoI and SoS found in the instruments/initiatives of the Commission can be 
traced back to the relevant EDA initiatives. 
Thirdly the EDA initiatives provide a complementary pathway that assists MSs to implement 
specific aspects the DSP Directive framework. For instance as presented above,
65
 this is the 
case for the SoS and SoS initiatives of the EDA which have been adapted to assist MSs with 
the application of the relevant parts of the DSP Directive.  
5.2 Impact on Political Dimension of Defence Procurement Integrations  
From the perspective of the political dimension of defence procurement integration this 
chapter argues that the impact of EDA’s initiatives has been fundamental. 
Firstly EDA’s creation alone with its mandate signalled a move towards more Europe, or 
better more EU, in the area of defence procurement.  
More importantly it is argued that the EDA had a “numbing” effect on the reactionary and 
atavistic reflexes of Member States in the context of defence procurement integration through 
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 See above sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6  
the deliberation of its soft law instruments and policy initiatives. It should be remembered 
that the EDA is a particular kind of EU Agency. It comes under the CFSP pillar, is financed 
by participating MSs, not the EU Budget, and its staff is composed of seconded national 
officials. The Commission takes part in the deliberations of the Steering Board but without 
any voting rights. This environment seems to have created a more fertile ground for the 
discussion of national preferences and contemplation about the design of policy instruments 
in the area. In this sense the use of the various online portals for sharing information amongst 
MSs showed on the one hand to Member States that using a more open transparent 
(European) approach in the context of defence procurement activities was not an anathema 
and perhaps could lead to useful outcomes. Likewise, as discussed above
66
 these exercises 
provided the Commission with useful information for “selling” the proposal of the DSP 
Directive to the MSs.  
Furthermore the EDA managed to create a forum where constructive discussion of the 
different preferences between MSs with significant domestic defence industrial capacity and 
those with small and medium sized ones could take place without hampering flexibility. It 
should be remembered that such differences had led to the creation of OCCAR initially as an 
“exclusive” club. The setup of the EDA created an environment where all participating 
Member States had –or were led to believe that they had- equal stakes in the process. We 
argue that this environment appears to have played a significant role in preparing a more 
receptive atmosphere for what was to follow, namely the Commission regulatory “defence 
package”.  
These observations could be supported by a number of facts. For example although Spain and 
Hungary decided not to join the CoC initially they did so a year after. Even more 
interestingly Denmark who participates neither in the EDA nor in the non-legally binding 
CoC because of its general opt out of CFSP initiatives that may have defence and military 
implications voted in the Council of Ministers in favour of the enactment of the legally 
binding and enforceable DSP Directive. 
In other words the EDA through its initiatives played a legitimising role of a process of 
discussion of policies/preferences linked with core state functions (the “tools of national 
sovereignty” (de Vestel 1998, 197)) at the EU level. This legitimising role in effect assisted 
the successful conclusion of the Commission’s initiatives. Although it is difficult to prove the 
counterfactual we argue that without the existence of the EDA the adoption of the 
Commission’s defence package might not have been certain (or at the very least it would not 
have been adopted in the record time in which it was). After all we have the example of the 
unsuccessful attempt for a process of moderate harmonisation of defence procurement that 
the Commission had undertaken in the late 90s.
67
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67
 Although it could be argued that the timing of the EU Commission’s first initiatives in the second half of the 
90s  was not the most auspicious due to the economic and political outlook at the time we argue that it could still 
function as a useful point of comparison for the following reasons: a) Although the economic and political 
context in the late 90s was not identical with the economic and political situation in 2003 -we use 2003 as a 
point of reference because it coincides with the invitation of the EU Parliament to the Commission to take 
Moreover the observant student of defence procurement integration will notice that behind 
the triumphant words of press releases about the “harmonisation” of defence procurement in 
the EU in reality the DSP Directive leaves many issues “flexibly unclear”  –and many 
questions unanswered. The DSP Directive includes many exemptions and has other aspects 
that require further clarification. This could be described as a process of “controlled 
communitarisation” of defence procurement. In other words the new regulatory framework is 
characterised by “incomplete contracts” that will need to be renegotiated as the integration 
process progresses.
68
 The role of the EDA remains crucial in this regard. 
 
6. In Lieu of Conclusions – A look into the future  
The present chapter examined EDA’s role in European defence procurement integration thus 
far and argued that its impact has been significant. It analysed in particular the contribution of 
EDA’s initiatives in the legal/regulatory and political dimension of this process.  
The prima facie antagonism between the initiatives of the regulatory and policy initiatives of 
the EDA and the Commission has had one clear outcome: the furtherance of regulatory and 
political aspects of integration in defence procurement. To use a metaphor, the initiatives of 
the EDA and the Commission could be described as a game of chess where each player 
responds to the moves of the other and tries to establish an advantage; however what is 
important from the point of view of the integration process is not so much the specific moves 
but the fact that the game is being played. In this regard the presence of the EDA was key for 
the game to start and more importantly to continue.    
So what does the future hold for EDA in the field of defence procurement? We identify four 
strands where the EDA can continue to play a central role in the post DSP Directive 
landscape. We also identify a necessary condition for this to happen.      
Firstly the exemption of collaborative R&D procurement from the field of application of the 
DSP Directive may provide an incentive to MSs to engage in collaborative projects –since 
among other advantages it would guarantee some work sharing for their domestic industry –
something that based on the standard rules of the Directive is not possible in principle. In 
such a case the EDA could play a role in facilitating the coordination of the operational 
requirements of participating MSs.  
Secondly as already mentioned under section 4.6 the EDA could in time become a central 
purchasing body in the area of off-the-self procurement for participating MSs; initially for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
action-  they were not so fundamentally different in a way that it would prevent a meaningful comparison b) the 
points where the previous initiative failed we would argue could be linked with the lack of a dedicated 
body/agency below the level of the Council of Ministers where the preferences of the Member States could be 
presented and debated in a continuous way by medium ranked national defence officials/experts.   
68
 Without attempting a detailed analysis here one could identify the following areas: the operational limits of 
the “subcontracting” provisions of the DSP Directive; SoI; SoS; the issue of offsets which has not been touched 
by the directive directly –the guidance note of the Commission is not part of the “contract” but rather the 
clarification of the position of one influential player in the next step of renegotiation; collaborative procurement;  
government to government procurement. 
simple standardised products and progressively for more sophisticated equipment –depending 
on the level of coordination of MSs operational requirements. 
Thirdly the EDA could work in unison with the Commission in order to provide more clarity 
to some important yet challenging policy areas linked with the implementation of the DSP 
Directive such as the SoI and SoS.  
Fourthly and linked with the above the EDA could play the role of honest broker in the next 
phases of integration in defence procurement between MSs and the Commission. For 
example an area where the EDA ought to act constructively is the area of offsets. The area 
remains a point of contention between the Commission and some MSs. Another important 
area is that of standardisation in the field of defence and security procurement. 
Finally it is important to note that all this is based on a necessary condition: the continuing 
willingness of MSs to engage in further integration in defence procurement. It was submitted 
above in section 5.1 that the greater transparency brought by the EDA initiatives led –
unwittingly perhaps- to the strengthening of the Commission’s position. Will the realisation 
of this fact lead MSs to return το their old more secretive and cautious ways? This is not 
impossible. If this were to happen then the EDA would become a victim of its own success. 
A lot will depend eventually on the way that the Commission will enforce the DSP Directive. 
Perhaps this explains the cautious approach followed by the Commission thus far; it seems 
that the stakeholders seem to realise that the priority is the continuance of the chess game and 
not the pronouncement of a precipitous – and thus pyrrhic- victory over the “opponent”.  
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